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The past year has demonstrated yet again that Turkish foreign policy and the dynamics of its 
formation are of vital interest to American regional interests, be they in the Middle East, 
Balkans/Aegean, Caucasus, or Central Asia. The tussle over Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
particular exposed certain American assumptions and expectations as unreciprocated by our 
"strategic partner" in Ankara. Likewise, Washington was shown to have an incomplete grasp of 
domestic politics' impact on Turkish foreign policy making. Philip Robins' Suits and Uniforms thus 
ought to have been required reading for American policy makers handling Turkey, given its 
breadth of perspective, analytical sophistication, and the kind of empirical depth offering a 
corrective to misapprehensions concerning a long-standing NATO ally. Though not without 
drawbacks, the author quite adeptly fulfills his "hope that the greatest contribution of the book is 
in providing ideas and empirical material that can be plundered" (5) by multi-disciplinary scholars 
and policy-makers alike. In this respect, his own previous writing on the subject permits him 
thorough familiarity with the evolving literature and unsurpassed access to Turkish as well as 
international diplomats and politicians. The reader benefits immensely.[1]  
 
Three arguments animate this study. First, "in the arena of foreign affairs, Turkey is a status quo 
power" (6). Stasis in terms of borders, regimes, and existing alliances has remained essential to 
Turkey since the 1950s, even after the end of the Cold War. In Robins' view, this has rendered 
Turkey a "passive player rather than an initiator of change" (6) even when "a new normatively-
based solidarity among allies" (19) has begun to overturn the previous givens of international 
relations. Second, Turkey's Western orientation has remained strong, partially to shore up 
domestically a threatened Kemalist and westernizing elite. Third, Turkey has been and remains 
an exceedingly cautious international relations player, "determinedly committed to a multilateral 
political orientation" (8). 
 
Though they bear constant repetition as a warning to those who would deploy Turkey as a 
regional "go-to guy," such arguments are not as innovative as Robins' narrative structure. After 
brief discussion of Turkey's responses to the Cold War era's concluding events, the author plots 
out the architecture of foreign policy making and implementation. By illuminating the roles and 
priorities of the various players in Turkish international relations, he encourages the reader to 
view Turkish foreign policy efficacy as a function of the relationships among political parties, 
prime and foreign ministers, the foreign ministry bureaucracy, and the military. He argues 
convincingly for a pattern whereby strong personalities devoting time to foreign relations—such 
as Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in the 1986-1991 period—or a cooperative approach among 
Foreign Ministry professionals—such as Hikmet Cetin and Ozdem Sanberk until 1994—result in 
relatively coherent, normalized foreign relations. By contrast, periods of coalition government—
from 1995-1999—produce insecure leaders characterized by "fragmentation and competition" 
(64) in foreign policies. It is in this latter environment that the military's influence on foreign 
policies is greatest. Unlike the conventional wisdom of the 1990s, however, he also includes 
Parliament and public opinion among players with seats, albeit second tier ones, at the foreign 
policy table. This is a prescient inclusion in light of events in Spring 2003. 
 
Robins then examines the "domestic motivators" of Turkey's foreign policies. Inspired by the aim 
to espouse a more "holistic perspective" (5), strong chapters on the role of historical memory and 
ideology in Turkish approaches to the outside world remind us that history is for Turks "a body of 
critically important stories that says who the Turks are, where they come from, what their 
formative experiences have been, and even what their mission is in the modern world" (134). 
Likewise, "ideology is at least as important as geopolitics in the formulation and pursuit of Turkish 
foreign policy" (159). Examination of pre-WWII Turkish history, as well as case studies of Turkish 
relations with the Arabs, the European Union, and the United States show how Turkish leaders 
have read foreign relations both as a quest for total integration into Europe, the West, and its 
multilateral institutions, and also as a tale of Western designs to fragment Turkey—the Sevres 
Syndrome—or exclude it from an ethno-religiously exclusive club—suggesting "the lone, 
friendless wolf of Turkish mythology" (109). As regards US-Turkish relations, American 
responses to Turkish moves from the 1960s on "have tended to reconfirm the Turkish intuition 
that the United States cannot be entirely relied upon" (133). The ultimate lesson of historical 
memory for Turkish foreign policy makers is "to be suspicious, especially of their neighbors" (135) 
with even the US and NATO allies proving not entirely trustworthy. 
 
These chapters are accompanied by discussions of the role of security, defense acquisitions, and 
anti-PKK operations in Turkey's international relations. This thematic approach is most helpful, 
and is all the more inclusive as it addresses the growing prominence of economic development 
needs in Turkey's foreign policy calculations, from the Ozal years forward. The reader finds that 
whether in relation to the EU or Russia, concern for economic relations "has helped to create 
convergences and complementarities at a time when bilateral relations were often under periods 
of great strain" (238). Such a conclusion has important implications for the future of relations 
between Turkey and Iran, as well as between Turkey and the evolving Iraq. Just as intriguing 
given the Islamist-affiliated Justice and Development Party's domination of domestic Turkish 
politics are sections detailing the Islamist sector's understanding of Turkish history and ideology 
as relates to foreign relations. Not only does Robins provide a guide to possible future initiatives, 
but—particularly in reference to the EU—he also delivers a reminder of the Islamist political 
makeover the current ruling party seeks to effect.  
 
The book closes with strong case studies of all of these dynamics in action. Conveying the 
sensibility of the 1990s, when this book was conceptualized, chapters deal with Turkish-Israeli 
relations, interactions between Turkey and the Turkic Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 
Turkey's role in the Bosnian crises, and the insurmountable challenges faced by Ankara in 
Northern Iraq, as it sought to avoid offending poorly-articulated American interests while 
manipulating Iraq's Kurds against the Iran- and Syria-supported PKK. As regards Turkey and 
Israel, he eschews the jaundiced eye of other Western scholars,[2] emerging with the well-
considered judgment that "the two countries might have looked forward to a broad-based 
relationship across state institutions and civil society, with a solid bilateral grounding.… [Yet] the 
broad foundation to the relationship was lost sight of as the military and defense relationship 
came to eclipse all else" (269). Turks, Israelis, and Americans who have supported this kind of 
relationship should bear Robins' assessment in mind. 
 
Completed in July 2002, this book suffers the fate of most works dealing with contemporary 
matters: the narrative has been overtaken by events, most notably the Iraq War. Here, rather than 
Kemalists, an Islamist government was in power, possessing an absolute majority of seats in 
parliament—quite rare in Turkish politics. The military has traditionally reacted poorly to Islamist 
politicians, having unseated the new ruling party's ideological forebears. Now, however, it 
remained rather quiescent, some even accusing it of diffidence and inactivity. Still, the new 
government's leaders—including an interim prime minister and foreign minister, as well as a 
lurking heir apparent—professed Turkey's enduring pro-US orientation, while possessing very 
little experience in or inclination towards foreign policy. From December 2002 to March 2003, 
observers saw two "strategic partners" careen out of control in negotiations for cooperation in the 
war against Iraq, resulting in serious mid-term damage to bilateral relations.[3]  
At first blush, then, this book's utility is limited to historical inquiry. Yet, the merit of Robins' work is 
that it discusses those very issues that were central to the failure of Turkish-American 
cooperation to fully materialize. These include the foreign relations "system" of Turkey,[4] and 
how alterations to the cast and relative standing of characters determines Turkish international 
relations efficacy; the role of historical memory in Turkish attitudes towards other countries and 
foreign engagements; the attitudes of Turkey's Islamists towards Turkey's role in both the western 
system and the Middle East; and the importance of economic concerns in foreign relations, 
particularly at times of domestic economic hardship—the case in 2002-2003. Several sections of 
this book might thus have been read by planners of OIF as a guide of what not to do in relations 
with Turkey. 
 
As a comprehensive, multi-region examination of the substance and motivators of Turkish foreign 
policy over the last decade-and-a-half, Robins' book is an excellent, unique contribution to a 
literature dominated mostly by single-issue studies by authors from the region.[5] There are, 
however, two flaws in this book, one substantive, and the other structural. First, Suits and 
Uniforms is quite simply not about suits and uniforms. In other words, despite the book's alluring 
title, it does not focus, either thematically or in terms of its empirical case studies, on the 
relationship between the military high command and Turkey's civilian foreign policy makers, be 
they career diplomats or elected politicians. The chapter on foreign policy players does have a 
very short section on the military and notes the importance of the until-recently military-dominated 
National Security Council. Robins asserts here, however, that "in the area of foreign policy the 
military has tended to be less overtly involved" (77), except in times of civilian disorganization. 
The chapter on security in foreign policy, though a strong review of the Turkish military's force 
transformation and acquisition efforts, again is without substantive examination of the military's 
ongoing input on foreign policy. Coverage of the dynamics and patterns of the suits-uniforms 
interaction is thus too minimal to merit its inclusion in the title as suggestive of a study of civil-
military relations in the foreign policy making process. This drawback is all the more concerning 
as observers today remain unsure of why the military high command and civilian policy makers 
interacted as they did in the course of American-Turkish negotiations over Iraq. 
 
The second chief drawback is a function of the book's structure. Its thematic approach frustrates 
the reader who pursues a more straightforward and digestible narrative. As compared to more 
conventional studies then,[6] Suits and Uniforms conveys the impression of detailed yet unlinked 
vignettes. Since it uses examples of Turkish foreign relations to prove analytical points rather 
than first presenting a broad narrative on which subsequent analysis is based, one might miss the 
real comprehensiveness of the book's coverage and emerge with an incomplete grasp of the 
course of Turkey's global foreign relations. This is unfortunate, since Robins' sophisticated 
analysis and focus on a wide gamut of issues central to the crafting and implementation of 
Turkey's foreign policy render Suits and Uniforms a first-rate source for students of international 
relations, security studies, Middle Eastern history, and Turkish domestic politics. This reviewer 
enthusiastically awaits a revised edition. 
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